Abstract. We investigate the hardness of finding solutions to bivariate polynomial congruences modulo RSA composites. We establish necessary conditions for a bivariate polynomial to be one-way, second preimage resistant, and collision resistant based on arithmetic properties of the polynomial. From these conditions we deduce a new computational assumption that implies an efficient algebraic collision-resistant hash function. We explore the assumption and relate it to known computational problems. The assumption leads to (i) a new statistically hiding commitment scheme that composes well with Pedersen commitments, (ii) a conceptually simple cryptographic accumulator, and (iii) an efficient chameleon hash function.
Introduction
In this paper, we investigate the cryptographic properties of bivariate polynomials modulo random RSA composites N = pq. We ask: for which integer polynomials f ∈ Z[x, y] does the function f : Z N × Z N → Z N defined by f appear to be a one-way function, a second-preimage-resistant function, or a collisionresistant function? We say that a polynomial f ∈ Z[x, y] is one-way if the function f : Z N ×Z N → Z N defined by f is one-way (Section 3.1). We similarly define second-preimage-resistance (Section 3.2) and collision-resistance (Section 3.3) of polynomials f ∈ Z[x, y].
Using tools from algebraic geometry we develop a heuristic for deducing the cryptographic properties of a bivariate polynomial over Z N from its arithmetic properties, namely from its properties as a polynomial over the rationals Q. We give a number of necessary conditions for a bivariate polynomial to be oneway, second-preimage-resistant, or collision-resistant. We also provide examples of polynomials f that appear to satisfy each of these properties and we offer separations between these three classes.
Taking collision resistance as an example, we conjecture that a bivariate polynomial f ∈ Z[x, y] that defines an injective function f : Q 2 → Q gives a collision resistant function f : Z 2 N → Z N where N is a random RSA modulus of secret factorization (see Section 3.3) . Constructing an explicit polynomial f ∈ Z[x, y] that is provably injective over the rationals is an open number theoretic problem [30] . However, even relatively simple polynomials appear to be injective over Q 2 . For example, Don Zagier [13, 34] conjectures that the polynomial f zag (x, y) := x 7 + 3y 7 , which we refer to as the Zagier polynomial, is injective over the rationals. Since the only apparent efficient strategy for finding collisions in f zag over Z N is to find rational collisions and reduce them modulo N , we conjecture that f zag is collision resistant over Z N . To build confidence in the assumption that f zag is collision resistant over Z N we discuss potential collisionfinding strategies and relate them to existing number theoretic problems.
Applications. We demonstrate that the existence of low-degree collision-resistant bivariate polynomials gives rise to very efficient instantiations of a number of cryptographic primitives.
First, we derive a statistically hiding commitment scheme which is computationally inexpensive to evaluate and composes naturally with Pedersen commitments. By "nesting" these new commitments inside of Pedersen commitments, we obtain an efficient zero-knowledge protocol for proving knowledge of an opening of a commitment which is nested inside of another commitment. Use of nested commitments reduces the length of transactions in an anonymous e-cash scheme [24] by roughly 70%.
Second, we demonstrate that the new commitment scheme, in conjunction with Merkle trees, can serve as a simple replacement for one-way accumulators. Though the communication complexity of our accumulator construction is asymptotically worse than that of strong-RSA accumulators [8] -O(log |S|) versus O(1) for a set S being accumulated-our construction has the benefit of being conceptually simple and easy to implement.
Third, from the same collision-resistant polynomial, we derive a new chameleon hash function, signature scheme, claw-free permutation family, and a variablelength algebraic hash function.
Related Work
Multivariate polynomials in Z N have a long history in cryptography. For example, the security of the Ong-Schnorr-Shamir signature scheme [26] followed from the hardness of finding solutions to a particular type of bivariate polynomial equation over Z N . Pollard and Schnorr later demonstrated a general attack against the hardness of finding solutions to such equations [28] .
Shamir related the hardness of factoring certain multivariate polynomials modulo N to the problem of factoring the modulus N itself [33] . Schwenk and Eisfeld proposed encryption and signature schemes reliant on the hardness of finding roots of random univariate polynomials f ∈ Z[x] modulo a composite N , and they prove that this problem is as hard as factoring N [31] .
This work introduces a new statistically hiding commitment scheme based on low-degree polynomials. Commitment schemes are used widely in cryptography. Prior work has derived statistically hiding commitment schemes from the discrete log problem [27] , the Paillier cryptosystem [12] , and the RSA problem [3] .
Verifying the correctness of opening a commitment in these existing schemes requires expensive modular exponentiations or elliptic curve scalar multiplications. Verifying an opening with our new commitment scheme requires just a few modular multiplications. By combining our new commitment scheme with traditional Pedersen commitments, we improve the communication efficiency of the Zerocoin decentralized e-cash construction [24] .
Given a Pedersen commitment and a finite set of elements S, our commitment scheme leads to a simple zero-knowledge protocol for proving knowledge of an opening x of the commitment such that x ∈ S. The length of the proof is log |S|. This technique, which uses Merkle trees [21] , has applications to anonymous authentication and credential systems and it has the potential to replace traditional RSA one-way accumulators, introduced by Benaloh and De Mare [5] and revisited by Barić and Pfitzmann [4] .
Camenisch and Lysyanskaya presented an efficient zero-knowledge protocol which proves that a value contained in a Pedersen commitment is also contained in a particular strong-RSA accumulator [8] . The Camenisch-Lysyanskaya accumulator produces a shorter proof of knowledge than ours does, but the conceptual simplicity and ease of implementation may make our Merkle-style proof more attractive for some applications.
The "zero-knowledge sets" of Micali, Rabin, and Kilian solve an orthogonal problem: a prover publishes a commitment to a set S and later can prove that x ∈ S without leaking other information about S [23] . In contrast, we are interested in hiding the value x but allow the set of items S to be public.
Cryptographic Properties of Polynomials
We begin by surveying the cryptographic properties of integer polynomials modulo random RSA composites. Our goal is to relate the algebraic properties of polynomials to their cryptographic complexity. In particular, we identify families of integer polynomials that give rise to progressively stronger cryptographic primitives: one-way functions, second-preimage-resistant functions, and collisionresistant functions.
Notation. We write x R ← S to indicate that the variable x takes on a value sampled independently and uniformly at random from a finite set S. A function f : Z → R + is negligible if it is smaller than 1/p(λ) for every polynomial p() and all sufficiently large λ. We denote an arbitrary negligible function in λ as negl(λ). We use the notation f (x) := x 2 to indicate the definition of a new term. In what follows, we let RSAgen(λ) denote a randomized algorithm that runs in time polynomial in λ. The algorithm generates two random len(λ)-bit primes p and q and outputs (p, q, N := p·q). Here len : Z + → Z + is some fixed function that determines the size of the primes p and q as a function of λ.
Let f ∈ Z[x, y] be a bivariate polynomial. For c ∈ Z consider the curve f (x, y) = c. The genus of this curve is a standard measure of its "complexity:" conics have genus zero, elliptic curves have genus one, and so on (see, e.g. [2, 18] ). We define the genus of a polynomial f as follows:
As we will see, the genus of a polynomial f has some relation to its cryptographic properties. While we focus on bivariate polynomials, most of the following discussion generalizes to multivariates.
We use the following terms throughout this section to describe relationships between curves. (For more precise definitions, see Hindry and Silverman [18, Sec. A.1.2].) A rational map from a curve C to another curve C ′ is a pair of rational functions g and h mapping points (x, y) on C to points (g(x, y), h(x, y)) on C ′ . A birational map from C to C ′ is a rational map which is a bijection between points on C and C ′ such that the map's inverse is also rational. Two curves C and C ′ and are birationally equivalent if there is a birational map from C to C ′ . An automorphism is a birational map from a curve to itself.
One-way Polynomials
One-way functions are the basis of much of cryptography. A function g : X → Y is one-way if, given the image c = f (x) of a random point x ∈ X, it is hard to find an 
Clearly linear polynomials are not one-way. A result of Pollard and Schnorr [28] shows that quadratic polynomials, indeed all genus zero polynomials, are not one-way. Proof sketch. For all c ∈ Q the curve f (x, y) = c is of genus zero, or is a product of genus zero curves. A genus zero curve is birationally equivalent to a linear or quadratic curvef (x, y) = 0 [18, Theorem A.4.3.1] . Iff (x, y) is linear in one of the variables x or y then finding points on this curve is easy thereby breaking the one-wayness of f . This leaves the case wheref (x, y) is quadratic in both x and y. Let N be an output of RSAgen(λ). Letf ∈ Z[x, y] be a quadratic polynomial in x and y and let c ∈ Z N . There is an efficient algorithm that for most c ∈ Z N finds an (x 0 , y 0 ) ∈ Z 2 N such thatf (x 0 , y 0 ) = c in Z N , breaking the one-wayness of f . See for example [6, Sec. 5.2] for a description of the algorithm. ⊓ ⊔ Theorem 3 played an important role in analyzing the security of the OngSchnorr-Shamir signature scheme [26] . The scheme depended on the difficulty of finding solutions (x, y) to the equation:
for known constants a, b ∈ Z N . Since this equation defines a genus-zero curve, Theorem 3 shows that it is possible to efficiently find solutions without knowledge of the factors of N . Pollard and Schnorr demonstrated an attack against the scheme soon after its publication [28, 32] .
One-way Polynomials. It is not known how to break the one-wayness of polynomials f ∈ Z[x, y] that are not genus zero. Thus, for example, even a simple polynomial such as f (x, y) = y 2 − x 3 may be one-way, although that would require further study.
Second Preimage Resistant Polynomials
We define a similar notion for polynomials:
is second preimage resistant if, for every p.p.t. algorithm A, the following advantage is a negligible function of λ:
Since genus 0 polynomials are not one-way they are also not second preimage resistant. It is similarly straight-forward to show that no genus-one polynomial is second preimage resistant. To see why, let f ∈ Z[x, y] be a polynomial such that f (x, y) = c is a curve of genus one for all but finitely many c ∈ Q. Then f is not second preimage resistant because of the group structure on elliptic curves. That is, let N be an output of RSAgen(λ). Choose a random pair (x 0 , y 0 ) ∈ Z 2 N and set c := f (x 0 , y 0 ) ∈ Z N . Then P = (x 0 , y 0 ) is a point on the curve f (x, y) = c and so is the point 2P = P + P where addition refers to the elliptic curve group operation. With overwhelming probability 2P is not the point at infinity and therefore, given P as input, the adversary can output 2P as a second preimage for P . It follows that f is not second preimage resistant.
Even polynomials that give higher genus curves need not be second preimage resistant. For example, a hyperelliptic polynomial of genus g ≥ 2 has the form
is a polynomial of degree 2g + 1 or 2g + 2. The simple fact that f (x 0 , y 0 ) = f (x 0 , −y 0 ) immediately gives a second preimage attack on these polynomials: given (x 0 , y 0 ) the attacker outputs (x 0 , −y 0 ) as a second preimage.
The fact that all curves of genus two are hyperelliptic [18, Theorem A.4.5.1] leads to the following proposition:
This proposition, in combination with Theorem 3 and Proposition 5 means that all second preimage resistant polynomials must have genus at least three.
As outlined above, elliptic (genus one) and hyperelliptic (genus two) polynomials are not second preimage resistant because there are non-trivial automorphisms on the associated curves. We say that a polynomial f ∈ Z[x, y] is automorphism free if, for all but finitely many c ∈ Q, the curve f (x, y) = c has no automorphisms over Q, apart from the trivial map (x, y) → (x, y). It is natural to conjecture that every automorphism-free polynomial f ∈ Z[x, y] is second preimage resistant.
Poonen constructs a large family of automorphism-free polynomials, in arbitrarily many variables and of arbitrarily large degree [29] . For example, he proves that the polynomial f (x, y) = x 3 + xy 3 + y 4 is automorphism-free over the rationals [29] .
A Historical Aside: q-Way Preimage Resistance. A stronger notion of preimage resistance for a function f : U → V , called q-way preimage resistance, states that given a random v ∈ V and random points u 1 , . . . , u q in U such that
As before, one can define a similar property for polynomials. That is, a polynomial f in Z[x, y] is q-way preimage resistant if, for a random RSA moduli N and a random c ∈ Z N , given q points on the curve f (x, y) = c in Z N , it is hard to find another point on this curve.
Kilian and Petrank [19] proposed an authentication scheme whose security is based on the q-way preimage resistance of the polynomial f KP (x, y) = x e −y e , for some small odd e, say e = 17. In their scheme, q is the total number of users in the system. Naor [25] refers to the computational assumption that f KP is q-way preimage resistant as the Difference RSA Assumption. We note that the polynomial f KP is not even second preimage resistant because there is a non-trivial automorphism (x, y) → (−y, −x) on the curve. In other words, for any point (x 0 , y 0 ) we have that f KP (x 0 , y 0 ) = f KP (−y 0 , −x 0 ). This bad symmetry appears to violate the security properties needed for the Kilian-Petrank identification scheme, but the scheme can be modified to resist such attacks.
Camenisch and Stadler [10, Sec. 6] used a similar assumption to construct group signatures. They need the polynomial f CS (x, y) = x e1 + ay e2 to be q-way preimage resistant for some small e 1 and e 2 . They propose using e 1 = 5 and e 2 = 3. We observe in that next section that the polynomial f (x, y) = x 5 + y 3 is not collision resistant. Nevertheless, it may be second preimage resistant.
Collision-Resistant Polynomials
and an integer N , we say that
is collision resistant if for every p.p.t. algorithm A the following advantage is a negligible function of λ:
In the previous two subsections, we observed that polynomials f ∈ Z[x, y] which are of genus g ≤ 2 or which are hyperelliptic, are not second preimage resistant and thus are not collision resistant.
Even polynomials that are second preimage resistant are not necessarily collision resistant. For example, in Section 3.2 we suggested that the polynomial f (x, y) = x 3 + xy 3 + y 4 may be second preimage resistant. However, it is certainly not collision resistant, since for any r ∈ Q, the points (r 4 , 0) and (0, r 3 ) constitute a collision.
Attacking Collision Resistance Over the Rationals. Suppose that a polynomial f ∈ Z[x 1 , . . . , x ℓ ] has a rational collision. That is, there are rational points
. Then, for most 1 RSA moduli N , the pointsx 0 andx 1 give a collision for f in Z N . This breaks the collision resistance of f when the security parameter λ is sufficiently large. Indeed, for sufficiently large λ the attack algorithm can construct the fixed rational pointsx 0 andx 1 by exhaustive search and obtain collisions for f for most RSA moduli output by RSAgen(λ).
The discussion above shows that if a polynomial f ∈ Z[x 1 , . . . , x ℓ ] has a rational collision then f is not collision resistant. We summarize this in the following proposition.
defines an injective function from Q ℓ to Q then f is said to be an injective polynomial. Proposition 9 shows that the search for collisionresistant polynomials must begin with the search for an injective polynomial over the rationals.
Injective Polynomials. Even the existence of bivariate injective polynomials is currently an open problem. Poonen [30] shows that they exist under certain number theoretic conjectures. Moreover, Poonen [30, Lemma 2.3] shows that if f ∈ Z[x, y] has only a finite number of rational collisions then one can use f to construct an injective polynomial g ∈ Z[x, y] by pre-composing f with a suitable polynomial map. In other words, an "almost" injective polynomial can be converted to an injective one.
Although proving that a particular polynomial is injective over Q is currently out of reach, there are simple polynomials that appear to have this property. In particular, Don Zagier 2 conjectures that the polynomial f zag (x, y) := x 7 + 3y 7 (the "Zagier polynomial") defines an injective function from Q 2 to Q. As indirect evidence, Cornelissen [13, Remarque 10] and Poonen [30, Remark 1.7] remark that the four-variate generalization of the abc-conjecture [7] implies that f (x, y) = x e + 3y e is injective over the rationals for "sufficiently large" odd integers e. Experimentally, we have confirmed that there are no rational collisions in f zag for rationals with height less than 100.
ℓ-Variate Injective Polynomials over Q from Merkle-Damgård. Given a bivariate injective polynomial over Q, it is possible to construct ℓ-variate injective polynomials over Q for every ℓ > 2 using the Merkle-Damgård construction for collision-resistant hash functions [15, 22] . For example, applying one step of Merkle-Damgård to f zag shows that if f zag is injective then so is the following three-variate polynomial:
Injective Polynomials and Collision Resistance. Proposition 9 states that, for a polynomial f to be collision resistant over Z N , f must be injective over the rationals. The following conjecture asserts the converse: injectivity over the rationals is sufficient for collision resistance.
This conjecture is based on the intuition that the only efficient way to find collisions in f over Z N is to find collisions in f over Q. Since collisions over Q do not exist it may be difficult to find collisions over Z N .
We only state Conjecture 10 to stimulate further research on this topic. The conjecture is not needed for this paper. For the applications described in this paper, we only need the collision resistance of an explicit low-degree polynomial in Z[x, y]. Nevertheless, if Conjecture 10 is true it would give a clean characterization of collision resistant polynomials in terms of their arithmetic properties.
For the applications in paper, the following assumption suffices.
We ) gives a useful polynomial h. However, we do not know how to construct a useful h just given f and N . Furthermore, even if efficiently constructing a useful h is possible, the attack algorithm will need to find a rational collision on the resulting g and this may not be feasible in polynomial time.
Attack Strategy II: Algebraic Extensions. Another avenue for attacking the collision resistance of f zag in Z N is via algebraic extensions. Let g be an irreducible polynomial in Z[x] and consider the number field K = Q[x]/(g). Suppose the adversary constructs g so that it knows an efficiently computable map ρ : K → Z N (this can be done by choosing the polynomial g so that the adversary knows a zero of g in Z N ). Now, even if f zag is injective as a function Q 2 → Q, it may not be injective as a function
3]: the points ( 7 √ 3, 0) and (0, 1) are a collision. If the adversary could find a collision of f zag in K 2 this collision may lead to a Z N collision for f zag . However, for a random RSA modulus N , it is not known how to efficiently construct an extension K such that (i) f zag : K 2 → K is not injective, and (ii) the adversary has an efficiently computable map ρ : K → Z N .
Assumption 11 merits further analysis and we hope that this work will stimulate further research on this question. 
Random Self-Reduction. Finally, we mention that the collision finding problem for the family of polynomials {x e + ay e } a∈ZN has a random self reduction. Given a collision-finding algorithm A(N, a) that outputs a Z N collision in x e +ay e for a non-negligible fraction of choices of a ∈ Z N , it is possible to construct a collision-finding algorithm B(N, a) that finds collisions for every choice of a with high probability. On input (N, a) Algorithm B chooses a random r ← Z N , and calls A(N, r e a). When A outputs the collision (x 0 , y 0 ), (x 1 , y 1 ), algorithm B obtains the following collision on the original curve: (x 0 , ry 0 ), (x 1 , ry 1 ). If A fails then B can try again with a fresh random choice of a ∈ Z N . After an expected polynomial number of iterations algorithm B will find a collision for the given polynomial x e + ay e .
A Nestable Commitment Scheme From Polynomials Over Z N
Having argued that it is infeasible to find collisions in the function f zag (x, y) = x 7 +3y 7 mod N (Assumption 11), we now turn to the cryptographic applications of this new computational assumption. In this section, we demonstrate that the collision-resistance of f zag leads to a commitment scheme where the procedure for verifying that a commitment was opened correctly uses only low-degree polynomials. The new commitment scheme is statistically hiding and its computational binding property is based on Assumption 11.
The commitment scheme composes naturally with zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge involving Pedersen commitments. In particular, given a Pedersen commitment C to one of our low-degree commitments, there is a succinct zero-knowledge protocol which proves knowledge of an opening of an opening of C. We call the inner commitment scheme nestable, since it can be efficiently nested inside of a Pedersen commitment. We discuss applications of nestable commitments in Sections 4.4 and 5.
Commitments
A commitment scheme is a tuple of efficient algorithms (Setup, Commit, Open), with the following functionalities: Setup(λ) → pp. The Setup routine is a randomized algorithm that runs in time polynomial λ and returns public parameters pp. These parameters define a message space M, a space of random blinding values R, and a space of commitments C. The following algorithms take the public parameters pp as an implicit argument. Commit(m) → (c, r). Given a message m ∈ M, return a commitment c ∈ C and a random blinding value r ∈ R used to open the commitment. Open(c, m, r) → {0, 1}. Given a commitment c, a message m, and a blinding value r, return "1" if (m, r) is a valid opening of c and "0" otherwise. For correctness, we require that, for all m ∈ M:
A statistically hiding commitment scheme must satisfy two security properties: 
Construction
The public parameters for our new commitment scheme consist only of an RSA modulus N , for which no one knows the factorization. To commit to a value m ∈ Z * N , the committer samples a random blinding value r from Z * N and computes the value of f zag at the point (m, r).
The construction of the new commitment scheme follows. Proof. Statistical hiding follows from a standard argument given in Appendix A. Computational binding follows directly from the collision resistance of f zag over Z N . One issue is Setup algorithm generates a random N such that gcd(φ(N ), 7) = 1 whereas Assumption 11 imposes no such restriction on N . Nevertheless, Assumption 11 implies the collision resistance of f zag for this modified distribution of N : By way of contradiction, assume there were an algorithm A which finds collisions in f zag with non-negligible probability ǫ when gcd(φ(N ), 7) = 1. Since algorithm RSAgen in Assumption 11 generates such N with probability about (5/6) 2 = 25/36 it follows that A will find collisions in with probability at least (25/36)ǫ when N is sampled as in algorithm RSAgen, violating Assumption 11.
Efficiency. Generating and verifying standard Pedersen commitments requires two modular exponentiations (or elliptic curve scalar multiplications). In contrast, our scheme requires only a few modular multiplications. On a workstation with a 3.20 GHz processor, for example, computing 10,000 Pedersen commitments in a subgroup of order ≈ 2 256 modulo a 2048-bit prime takes 16.54 seconds. Computing the same number of commitments using this new scheme takes 0.925 seconds-a factor of 17.9× speed-up.
Nestable Commitments
We say that a commitment scheme (Setup, Commit, Open) is nestable if, given Pedersen commitments to a message m, randomness r, and a commitment c, there is an succinct zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of values m, r, and c, such that c = Commit(m, r). In other words, there is a succinct protocol for proving knowledge of an opening of an opening of a Pedersen commitment. For our purposes, a succinct zero-knowledge protocol is one in which proof length is k|c| bits long, where k is a constant which does not depend on the security parameter.
We adopt the notation of Camenisch and Stadler [9] for specifying zeroknowledge proof-of-knowledge protocols. For example, PoK{x, y : X = g x ∨ Y = g x } indicates a protocol in which the prover and verifier share public values g, X, and Y , and the prover demonstrates knowledge of either a value x such that X = g x or a value y such that Y = g y . Given Pedersen commitments
a nestable commitment scheme has a succinct zero-knowledge protocol which proves knowledge of the statement:
For the commitment scheme outlined above, Commit(m, r) = m 7 + 3r 7 mod N , so the proof of knowledge protocol is:
7 h sc }.
The group G = g = h used for the proof must be a group of composite order N , where N is the RSA modulus used in the commitment scheme. As usual for
Pedersen commitments, no one should know the discrete logarithm log g h in G. For example, G might be the order-N subgroup of the group Z * p for a prime p = 2kN + 1, where k is a small prime. Alternatively, G could be an elliptic curve group of order N .
The fact that the verification equation for our commitment scheme is a fixed low-degree polynomial means that this proof can be executed succinctly using standard techniques [10] . This proof requires only one challenge and 20 elements of G. If N is a 2048-bit modulus, then the proof is roughly 5 KB in length.
In contrast, nesting Pedersen commitments inside of other Pedersen commitments does not lead to succinct proofs of knowledge. The shortest proofs of knowledge for nested Pedersen commitments require a number of group elements that is linear in the security parameter [11, Sec. 5.3.3] , whereas our proof requires only a constant number of group elements.
Being able to prove knowledge of an opening of a commitment which is itself nested inside of a commitment proves useful in constructing distributed e-cash schemes (Section 4.4) and set membership proofs (Section 5).
Application Sketch: Anonymous Bitcoins
The Zerocoin scheme for anonymizing Bitcoin transactions requires a proof of knowledge of an opening of an opening of a commitment [24] . For this purpose, Zerocoin uses Pedersen commitments nested inside of Pedersen commitments, which requires a proof-of-knowledge of the form: PoK{m, r, s :ĉ =ĝ (g m h r )ĥs }. The number of group elements exchanged in this proof is linear in the security parameter, since the proof uses single-bit challenges.
By using our nestable commitment scheme for the "inner" commitment, we reduce the number of group elements from linear to constant in the security parameter. This reduces the length of anonymous coin transactions in the Zerocoin scheme by roughly 70% (down to 12.0 KiB from 39.4 KiB when using a 2048-bit RSA modulus). When instantiated with our nestable commitments, Zerocoin maintains its unconditional privacy property and maintains doublespending prevention under Assumption 11.
Succinct Set Membership Proofs
A cryptographic accumulator, first defined by Benaloh and De Mare [5] , is a primitive which allows a prover to accumulate large set of values S = {x 1 , . . . , x n } into a single short value A. For every value x i in the accumulator, there is an accompanying short witness w i . By exhibiting a valid (x i , w i ) pair, a prover can convince a verifier that the value x i was actually accumulated into A. Informally, the security property of the accumulator requires that it be difficult to find a valid value-witness pair (x * , w * ) such that x * / ∈ S. Benaloh and De Mare give one example application of this primitive: the administrator of a club can accumulate the names of the members of the club into an accumulator A, distribute a witness to each member, and publish the accumulator value A. The value A is a concise representation of the club's membership list. A person can prove membership in the club by revealing her name x i and the witness w i to a verifier.
Camenisch-Lysyanskaya extend the basic accumulator primitive to allow for zero-knowledge proofs of accumulator membership [8] . That is, a prover can convince a verifier that the prover "knows" a valid value-witness pair (x, w) for a particular accumulator A, without revealing x or w. This augmented primitive allows for privacy-preserving authentication: a club member can prove that she is some member of the club defined by a membership list A without revealing which member she is.
We provide a construction that offers the same functionality as the CamenischLysyanskaya scheme with the cost of requiring slightly larger proofs-of length O(log |S|) instead of length O(1). The benefit of our construction is its simplicity: compared with the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya proof, which requires a nuanced security analysis, ours is relatively straightforward.
Definitions
A cryptographic accumulator is a tuple of algorithms (Setup, Accumulate, Witness, Verify) with the following functionalities: Setup(λ) → pp. Given a security parameter λ as input, output the public parameters pp. The other functions take pp as an implicit input. Setup runs in time polynomial in λ. Accumulate(S = {x 1 , . . . , x n }) → A. Accumulate the n items in the set S into an accumulator value A. Witness(S, x) → w or ⊥. If x / ∈ S, return ⊥. Otherwise, return a witness w that x was accumulated in Accumulate(S). To be useful, the length of w should be short (constant or logarithmic) in the size of S. Verify(A, x, w) → {0, 1}. Return "1" if the value-witness pair (x, w) is valid for the accumulator A. Return "0" otherwise.
Camenisch and Lysyanskaya, following Barić and Pfitzmann [4] , define an accumulator as secure, if for all polynomial-time adversaries A:
If an accumulator satisfies this definition, then it is infeasible for an adversary to prove that a value x was accumulated in a value A if it was not.
Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge of an Accumulated Value. In many applications, it is useful for a prover to be able to convince a verifier that the prover knows some value inside of an accumulator without revealing which value the prover knows. Such a proof protocol should satisfy the standard properties of soundness, completeness, and zero-knowledgeness [11, Sec. 2.9 ]. Camenisch and Lysyanskaya construct one such proof-of-knowledge protocol for the strong-RSA accumulator [8] and we exhibit a protocol for a Merkle-tree-style accumulator in Section 5.3.
Construction
Given a collision-resistant hash function H : D × D → D, which operates on a domain D such that S ⊆ D, it is possible to construct a simple accumulator using Merkle trees. For example, given a set S = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 }, the accumulator value A is the value A ← H(H(x 1 , x 2 ), H(x 3 , x 4 )). A witness w i that an element x i is in the accumulator is the set of O(log |S|) nodes along the Merkle tree needed to verify a path from x i to the root (labeled A).
The limitation of this accumulator construction is that it no longer admits simple zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge of (x, w) pairs, unless H has a very special form. For instance, if H is a standard cryptographic hash function (e.g., SHA-256), there is no straightforward zero-knowledge protocol for proving knowledge in zero knowledge of a preimage under H. By instantiating H with the function H(x, y) = x 7 + 3r 7 mod N , as we demonstrate in the following section, it is possible to execute this zero-knowledge proof succinctly. Fig. 1 . A perfect Merkle tree with eight leaves rooted at A. The shaded nodes are a witness to the fact that m2 is accumulated in A. The tree invariant is ai = H(ai0, ai1).
We first recall the standard construction of Merkle trees [21] and then describe the zero-knowledge proof construction. The construction from a general collision-resistant hash function family {H λ } ∞ λ=1 follows. Setup(λ) → H. Given a security parameter λ as input, sample a λ-secure collision-resistant hash function H from H λ . Setup runs in time polynomial in λ. Accumulate(S = {x 1 , . . . , x n }) → A. If |S| is not a power of two, insert "dummy" elements into S (e.g., by duplicating the first element of S) until |S| is a power of two. Construct a perfect Merkle tree of depth d = log 2 |S| using the hash function H with the members of S as its leaves and return the root A. Figure 1 depicts an example tree of depth three. Witness(S, x) → w or ⊥. If x / ∈ S, return ⊥. Otherwise, let the path from A to the message x be: P = (A, a b1 , a b1b2 , a b1b2b3 , . . . , a b1...b d ) , where a i0 is the left child of node a i , a i1 is the right child of node a i , and d is the number of edges between the root and leaf labeled x in the tree. The first component of the witness is the list of siblings of the nodes in the path P : w α = (ab 1 , a b1b2 , a b1b2b3 , . . . , a 
Return "1" if A = t 0 and "0" otherwise.
Proof of Knowledge of an Accumulated Value
When instantiated with a general hash function H, the Merkle-tree accumulator of the prior section does not admit a succinct proof of knowledge of an accumulated value. When instantiated with our new hash function H(x, y) = x 7 + 3y 7 mod N , however, there is a succinct proof of knowledge that the prover knows an opening of a Pedersen commitment C m such that some leaf of the accumulator Merkle tree has label m. The proof requires a group G = g = h of order N , as in Section 4.3. The proof length is log |S|, for a set S of elements accumulated.
The Setup algorithm outputs an RSA modulus N ← RSAgen(λ) such that gcd(φ(N ), 7) = 1 and such that no one knows the factorization of N . The hash function H is H(x, y) = x 7 + 3y 7 mod N and the accumulator domain D is Z * N . The high-level idea is that, if the prover wants to convince the verifier that a particular value m is accumulated in A, the prover commits to the values of all of the nodes in the Merkle tree along the path from the root to the leaf labeled m. The prover also commits to all of the witness values needed to recreate the path from the leaf labeled m down to the tree root. The prover can then convince the verifier in zero knowledge that these commitments together contain a path to some leaf in the tree, without revealing which one.
Assume that the prover has a value-witness pair (x, w) which convinces a verifier that x is accumulated in A. Denote the node values along the path from the root node, with value A, to the leaf node, with value x, in the Merkle tree as:
The prover now commits to every value p i in this path and to the values of the left and right children of p i in the Merkle tree. If the value of the left child is ℓ i and the right child is r i , the commitments are, for i = 0, . . . , d − 1:
The prover opens P 0 by publishing (p 0 , s 0 ) and the verifier ensures that p 0 = A and that P 0 = g p0 h s0 . The prover now can prove, for i = 0, . . . , d − 1, that each (P i , L i , R i ) tuple is well-formed using a standard discrete logarithm proof:
The prover then must prove that it knows an opening of the commitment P i+1 such that the opening is equal to an opening of either L i or R i . For i = 0, . . . , d− 1, the prover proves:
The complete proof is the set of commitment pairs
, the 2d proofs of knowledge, and the opening (p 0 , r 0 ) of the root commitment P 0 . The total length is O(d) = O(log |S|), since the tree has depth d = log |S| and each of the elements of the proof has length which is constant in |S|.
Security. The completeness and zero-knowledgeness properties follows from the properties of the underlying zero-knowledge proofs used and from the fact that Pedersen commitments are perfectly hiding.
To show soundness, we must demonstrate that if the verifier accepts, it can extract a value-witness pair (x * , w * ) for the original Merkle tree with nonnegligible probability by rewinding the prover. Starting at the root and working towards the leaves of the tree, we will be able to extract the prover's witness for each of the proofs of knowledge with non-negligible probability.
By induction on i, we can show that after d steps, the verifier will be able to extract the value-witness pair (x, w). The base case of the induction is i = 0 and the verifier can extract a preimage of A under H. From each of the i PoK α s, the verifier extracts an element of the witness w α (the preimage of p i under H). From each of the i PoK β s, the verifier extracts an element of the witness w β (whether the next node in the path is the left or right child of p i ).
6 Claw-Free Functions, Signatures, and Chameleon Hashes
In this section, we describe a few other applications arising from the assumed collision-freeness of the Zagier polynomial.
Claw-Free Functions and Signatures. Assumption 11 immediately gives rise to a family of trapdoor claw-free functions [14] . For each RSA modulus N selected as in Section 4.2, we can define a function family:
Following Damgård [14] , a function family F N is claw free if, given F N , it is difficult to find a "claw" (x, y, a, b) such that f a (x) = f b (y). For all p.p.t. adversaries A, we require that: Pr [ N ← RSAgen(λ), (x, y, a, b) ← A(N ) : f a (x) = f b (y) ] ≤ negl(λ).
The claw-freeness of F N follows from Assumption 11, since a claw in F N implies a collision in f (x, y) = x 7 + 3y 7 mod N . Additionally, the function family F N is trapdoor claw-free, since anyone with knowledge of the factors of N can find claws easily by choosing (x, y, a) arbitrarily and solving for b. This family F N is not quite a family of trapdoor claw-free permutations, since the range of two functions f a and f b in F N are not necessarily equal (i.e., f −1 b (f a (x)) is sometimes undefined). However, the fraction of choices of (a, b, x) for which this event occurs is negligible, so it is possible to treat F N as if it were a family of trapdoor claw-free permutations. In particular, this function family leads to a signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen message attacks in the standard model by way of the Goldwasser-Micali-Rivest signature construction [17] .
Chameleon Hash. This commitment scheme immediately gives rise to a new chameleon hash function. A chameleon hash, as defined by Krawczyk and Rabin, is a public hash function H(m, r) with a secret "trapdoor" [20] . A chameleon hash function has three properties:
1. Without the trapdoor, it is difficult to find collisions in H. That is, it is hard to find colliding pairs (m, r) and (m ′ , r ′ ) such that H(m, r) = H(m ′ , r ′ ). Chameleon hashes are useful in building secure signature schemes in the standard model [16] and for a number of other applications [20] .
To derive a chameleon hash scheme from our commitment scheme, set the public key to the RSA modulus N , and the secret key to the factorization of N . The hash function H is then H(m, r) = m 7 + 3r 7 mod N . Without the factors of N , it is difficult to find collisions but anyone with knowledge of the factors of N (the "trapdoor") can find collisions.
Chameleon hashes based on Pedersen commitments require two modular exponentiations to evaluate, while ours requires just a few modular multiplications.
Conclusion and Future Work
We have used arithmetic properties of bivariate polynomials over Q to reason about their cryptographic properties in the ring Z N . Using one particular lowdegree polynomial, f zag , we build a new statistically hiding commitment scheme, a conceptually simple cryptographic accumulator, and a computationally efficient chameleon hash function. To gain confidence in Conjecture 10 it would be interesting to prove it in the generic ring model [1] . We leave that for future work.
A Proof of Statistical Hiding
This appendix presents a proof that the commitment scheme of Section 4.2 is statistically hiding. To demonstrate that the statistical hiding property holds, we show that for any message m ∈ Z * N , the distribution of the value of a commitment c to m is statistically close to uniform.
The commitment c is generated by sampling a random value r ← R Z * N and letting c ← m 7 + 3r 7 . Since r ∈ Z * N , and since gcd(7, φ(N )) = 1, the RSA function f (x) = x 7 mod N defines a permutation on Z * N . Thus, there are exactly |Z * N | = φ(N ) possible commitments to m, and each of these values occurs with equal probability.
Let the random variable C take on the value of the commitment to m and let U be a random variable uniformly distributed over Z N . Then: 
